In the historic battle between the protagonists of political and military history on the one side, and those of social and economic history on the other, there was a tendency to lose sight of the fact that war itself -often treated as if belonging exclusively to the preserve of the political and military historians -could have very profound social and economic effects. Despite the fact that American society was less directly involved in the First World War than British society, American historians have on the whole been more ready to note the social and economic implications of that war. However the well-bred reluctance to have more to do with the nasty business of war than is absolutely necessary, has meant that bald statements about the »impact« of war have predominated over systematic analysis of the nature of this »impact«. Popular fascination with the first post-war decade has led to a proliferation of platitudes and cliches about the consequences of the war, which have doubtless served to turn the professional historian away from serious study of the subject 1 .
Elsewhere 2 I have suggested that serious commentators on the war can usually be allocated to one or other of three main categories: they are »tories«, »whigs« or »economists«. I noted that although Marxists have often referred to the dynamic effects of war, there is in fact no thorough Marxist analysis of the social consequences of World War I: there have, however, been a number of interesting works which might roughly be termed »sociological« in their overall approach. This four-fold division is perhaps more applicable to British than to American historiography, but suitably qualified it may well serve as a useful guide to the latter as well 3 . Typically there have been many important American studies of Britain during the first world war, while there are no noteworthy British accounts of the equivalent American experience. By the »tories« I mean those who continue to insist that the great events in history are the military and political events. They oppose what Professor Cyril Falls has called the »fallacious« theory that »the major, if not the sole, object of history should be the study of the artisan, the labourer and the peasant« 4 . Concerned with the strategic and military aspects of war, they realise that modern war necessarily involves the reorganisation of society. At times they come perilously close to justifying war by reference to the social change accompanying it. The first »tory« accounts of the first world war, in fact, are a part of the patriotic propaganda spawned by the war itself. In the summer of 1916 The Times (London) published a series of articles on the opportunities for social and political reconstruction provided by the war, subsequently republished with an introduction by that leading social imperialist, Lord Milner, as The Elements of Reconstruction (London, 1916 (London, 1919) , hardly lives up to the good intentions of its title, but it does touch on two key points to which »sociological« historians have been forced to return: war as a supreme test of existing institutions, forcing reorganization in the interests of greater efficiency; and war as a revelation of »the value of the manual worker to the state«. The outstanding example of the »tory« interpretation, concentrating on the problems of politics and strategy, but, almost as a by-product as it were, recognising the necessity for social reorganisation involved in total war, is W. S. Churchill's World Crisis (6 volumes, London, 1923-31) . Other authors in this canon, apart from Professor Falls, are Ν. H. Gibbs, John Terraine, Correlli Barnett, whose striking phrase, »war is the great auditor of institutions«, echoes the first of the points put forward by Worsfold, and a recent American historian, Paul Guinn 5 . The major work dealing with America falls very definitely into the »tory« category, in that it is essentially a hymn of praise to the great administrative reorganisation carried through by the American government in order to wage the war efficiently: »... even a democracy may act with speed, directness, efficiency and weight. One kind of victory, at least, was blocked by American intervention in the World War; and for once in history a great nation went whole-heartedly to combat, shared in the labor to defeat an enemy, and marched its men home carrying no plunder and asking none. The war years in the United States are a necessary diapter in the history of the World War. They constitute an even more important chapter in the history of democracy in action 6 .« Only one of Paxon's three volumes -America at War 1917-18 -actually covers the war years, and it is written entirely from the standpoint of the problems of government: there is, for example, no discussion of the effects of the war on the working classes. The third volume, Postwar Years: Normalcy, 1918 Normalcy, -1923 , is also pure narrative, with no attempt to assess or analyse the enduring social consequences of the war. War is the nastiest and most destructive of all human activities: the »whig« historians are in a worthy tradition when they seek either to gloss over the social effects of war, stressing that the antecedents of change lie elsewhere, or else to concentrate upon war's disruptions of traditional civilization, and upon the association between modern war and the growth of totalitarianism. In British historiography the classic »whig« account is that of F. W. Hirst, a Gladstonian liberal and editor of the Economist till the middle of the war when his doctrinaire laisser-faire ideas had become so out of tune with the war effort that he relinquished his post. In The Consequences of the War to Great Britain (Oxford, 1934) Hirst lamented that the war had intensified state control, greatly weakened liberalism, and had fostered »moral evils« and »social degeneracy«. Hysteria, untruth, propaganda, suppression of civic liberties: these are the products of war upon which »whig« historians have concentrated. Propaganda devices were exposed impressionistically by Arthur Ponsonby, an aristocratic liberal who joined the Labour Party at the end of the war, and, more systematically, by the American social scientist, Harold D. Lasswell 7 . The emotional and religious hysteria evoked by war was the main subject of two important studies by Carolyn E. Playne and Irene Cooper Willis 8 . The intolerance and suppression of free speech which characterised America rather more obviously than Britain (where, of course, there was mudi persecution of pacifists) has been carefully documented in Zediariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (2nd edition, Cambridge, Mass., 1942) and H. C. Peterson and G. C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917 -1918 (New York, 1957 . Professor George Mowry's essay, »The First World War and American Democracy« 9 , is a somewhat faint echo of the same kind of arguments and prejudices presented by F. W. Hirst: the war, he declared, had led to an increase in conformity and materialism.
The most interesting manifestation of the »whig« sensibility is the manner in which many outstanding historians, while clearly appreciating the significance of war in the social changes of the twentieth century, have perversely preferred to direct their energies towards studying the years prior to the war. I am afraid the simple fact is that it is easier to write descriptive »intellectual« history of the years of peace than to analyse the turbulent events of war. A major and justly-praised contribution to twentieth century American history, Henry F. May's The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time 1912 -1917 (New York, 1959 contains the remark that »everybody knows that at some point in the twentieth century America went through a cultural revolution«. Arguing that World War I was »not entirely the dividing line«, Professor May devotes only five pages to »The War and After« and the rest of a large book to the prewar years. Nonetheless his few comments on the war are extremely shrewd. He notes in true »whig« style that in some ways the conservative reaction against the prewar intellectual and progressive revolt was strengthened by the war, but adds that the entire process of revolt and reaction was changed and distorted by the war. Later he writes: »The war and its emotions passed with extraordinary suddenness. To see the full meaning of the story that ended in 1917 it is necessary to look beyond the complementary savage disillusion of the postwar years. At some time long after the Armi- stice whistles had stopped blowing, it became apparent that a profound change had taken place in American civilisation, a change that affected all the contenders in the prewar cultural strife. This was the end of American innocence... This change, on the way for a long time and precipitated by the war, is worth looking at very briefly as it affected several segments of the increasingly divided nation. The most obvious aspect of change was the complete disintegration of the old order, the set of ideas which had dominated the American mind so effectively from the mid-nineteenth century till 1912... The American culture of 1912 fell into pieces not because it was attacked but because attack, combined with the challenge of events, brought to light its old inadequacies 10 .« This is well said, but what American historiography now needs is some detailed analysis of the complicated experience, the experience of war, encapsulated in two of Professor May's phrases italicised here 11 .
More recently another American professor has written about prewar Britain in similar vein 12 . The analysis of the intellectual origins of the main social and cultural movements of the twentieth century is detailed and convincing. But although there are many hints that Professor Hynes is well aware of the significance of the war in giving currency and acceptability to concepts which formerly existed only in the minds of a few pioneers, each chapter resolutely closes in August 1914. At once point, in discussing prewar endeavours on behalf of the emancipation of women, Professor Hynes remarks that while Edwardian activists »did play a part« in the postwar achievement of new freedoms for women, »a more direct and brutal cause was the war itself« 13 . It is in connection with the emancipation of women that the »whig« reluctance to deal in detail with the social history of war, even when tacitly accepting its importance, has readied its most absurd lengths: Constance Rover's, Women 's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain 1866 -1914 (London, 1967 ) is a careful work which, as the title shows, brings the story to a close in 1914, just when, historically, it is about to become really interesting. The »effects of war« are condensed into two pages of scrappy »epilogue«. The »economists« are those commentators who, both at the end of the first world war, and when their interest was rekindled by the advent of the second world war, gave special attention to the economic reorganisation necessitated by the war. The massive multi-volume Economic and Social History of the War published throughout the interwar years under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, despite the »social« in the title, is almost exclusively preoccupied with the problems of state control and collectivist reorganisation of the economy in both Britain and America (as well as in many other countries). The most recent and best study in similar style is Samuel J. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain (New York, 1949 ) which nonetheless treads a fairly well beaten path, first pioneered by H. L. Gray's War Time Control of Industry (New York, 1918 ). An important study by an American participant in the events described (many of the Carnegie studies are also written by participants) is G. B. Clarkson, Industrial America and the World War: The Strategy behind the Lines, 1917 -1919 (Boston, 1923 . The advent of the second world war brought forth sudi books as Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in War (Washington, 1941) (London, 1930) . A statistician and author of a number of important social surveys, Bowley divided postwar changes into three categories: those mainly unconnected with the war; those accelerated (or retarded) by the war; and those directly attributable to the war -the destruction of life and of capital. He considered that the main postwar technological changes, sudi as the transition to oilfiring in ships, fell under the first heading, while certain other technological changes, such as the development of aviation, fell into the second category, as did the emancipation of women and the growth of political and social democracy. In Has Poverty Diminished? (London, 1925) Bowley had referred to his verdict of 1913 that »to raise the wages of the worst-paid workers is the most pressing social task with which the country is confronted today«, and concluded, »it has needed a war to do it, but that task has been accomplished«. To war's direct destruction of capital Bowley linked the imposition of high progressive taxation and the partial redistribution of income between social classes which resulted 15 .
Bowley brings us close to that category of study which I have somewhat vaguely termed »sociological«. Actually the question of the social effects of war has received much less attention from social scientists than might be expected. Two sociological concepts whidi are of value to the historian, however, are, first, the notion that in some respects war is analogous to natural disaster, and therefore produces the same kind of effects on the social psychology of the peoples involved in it 16 ; and, second, the theory of the Military Participation Ratio (MPR), that is, the greater the participation of low-status groups and classes in the war effort, the stronger the tendency towards social equality 17 . The first historian to endeavour to make systematic use of the MPR idea was Dr Philip Abrams in his article, »The Failure of Social Reform, 1918 18 . In many ways this article charts a similar course to that of R. H. Tawney cited above: both writers are finally concerned to demonstrate how little permanent change had accompanied the war in Britain. Curiously both suffer from the same blindness which afflicts the »tory« historians: they concentrate on the issues of government-sponsored legislation to the exclusion of any consideration of the unguided forces of change unleashed by war, irrespective of the actions of governments and politicians. So far there has been no comprehensive account of the American social experience in the first world war 19 ; for Britain there does exist my book, 7he Deluge: British Society and the First World War (London, 1965) . More recently I have tried to develop further my attempt at an analytical, or sociological, explanation of how war can foster social change. I have argued that the problem can be reduced to that of the four modes by which war affects society. War, at its simplest, is a matter of loss and gain: loss of life and capital (as Bowley pointed out); gain, perhaps, of territory or trade concessions. Modern total war almost invariably results in material loss all round, so that the first mode can be described as destruction and disruption: this destruction, obviously negative in its first effects, may also resultas a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, sometimes does -in rapid reconstruction going beyond the limits of what was originally destroyed. In Britain, for example, the disruptions brought about by the first world war to normal educational and health provision and to house-building gave an impetus to social construction on an entirely new scale. H. A. L. Fisher explained his Education Act of 1918 as being »framed to repair the intellectual wastage which has been caused by the war«: identical arguments were used to support the massive state initiative implied in the Housing Act of 1919. War is the supreme challenge to, and test of, a country's military institutions, and, in a war of any size, a challenge to its social, political and economic institutions as well. If the institutions are inadequate, they will collapse, as in Czarist Russia. However, the test of war need not provoke dissolution: it can, given a determined will to victory, provoke transformation in the direction greater efficiency. This second, test-dissolution-transformation mode, can be illustrated in Britain with reference to the testing and exposure of economic liberalism, the testing and exposure of the Liberal Party, the testing and rapid development of the country's scientific and technological resources, and the testing and speedy improvement of the country's social services. Feudal wars were essentially waged by a small aristocratic minority which alone shared in the spoils, with the peasant masses on both sides suffering from their depredations. In modern war there is greater participation on the part of larger groups within society, who tend correspondingly to benefit. This Military Participation mode has resulted in Britain in the gaining of the franchise by women, and in great social, economic and political gains for the working classes. Their gains in fact were threefold: because of their strengthened role in the market, their wages and living standards rose; because of their increased participation in activities and decisions that were, and were seen to be, important, their political and industrial organisation was toughened; because the government needed them, it gave them, mainly through the processes of legislation, enhanced recognition and status. Finally, war, in common with the great revolutions in history, is a colossal emotional and psychological experience. It is from this mode that great changes in the arts, in religious beliefs and intellectual attitudes, spring. More important, the emotional enthusiasm generated by war serves to reinforce the other three modes of change. This process is neatly summarised in an autobiographical account of »Why a Tory joined the Labour Party« at the end of the war: »Then came the war. It is impossible to say how greatly moved I was by the spectacle of loyalty and patriotism exhibited by the great mass of the nation. The workers poured out of the slums and rookeries in which they had been compelled to dwell, and fought with invincible courage and died with unquenchable heroism for a country that had treated them but poorly. Universal admiration was expressed for the valour of the British Army and Navy, and it was loudly proclaimed that Britain must be a land fit for heroes and that a »New England« was imperatively needed. I myself, on recruiting platforms and elsewhere, had said so as loudly as any, and meant what I said. I realized that the war had changed the whole atmosphere of the world. There are certain great historic events, like the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution, that have altered mankind for good. The war was one of these far-reaching forces.« The point here is not the truth or falsehood of the author's beliefs, but that he was moved by them to join the Labour Party 20 .
The various approaches to the question of war and society, »tory«, »whig«, »economic« and »sociological« are reflected in some of the leading general histories of twentieth century Britain and America. In Britain only two important narrative histories, C. L. Mowat's Britain between the Wars (London, 1955) and A. J. P. Taylor's English History 1914 -1945 (Oxford, 1965 have given any weight to the sociological aspect of war's impact on society, and then implicitly rather than explicitly. Other narratives continue to gloss over the effects of war.
In the United States full weight has usually been given to the economic reorganisation enforced by war, but social dianges are noted only in passing. Frank Freidel's America in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1960) , after giving considerable detail on the wartime economic reorganisation does include a list of the main social changes, but makes no attempt to explain how these changes have come about: »As for the war, it had raised the living standard of factory workers and built a powerfull labor movement; it had created great shifts in population and accompanying tensions. It had given a temporary bonanza to the farmer, stepped up mechanization of agriculture, and the brought the plow to tens of thousands of acres of semiarid prairie grasslands. Much of this transformation had been painful, and led to further difficult adjustments in the twenties. The war also had changed styles and fashions, and molded consumer demands into new channels. In little ways (such as the introduction of wrist watches for men, shorter skirts for women, and cigarettes for both) and in major ways that involved basic shifts in the economy, it was changing the pattern of life for most Americans 21 .« W. E. Leuchtenberg, The Perils of Prosperity 1914 -32 (Chicago, 1958 similarly is strong on the economic aspects of war, but he contrives to write a whole chapter on »The Revolution in Morals« without any references at all to the war -probably because in this treacherous realm description is always easier than analysis. Nowhere in the book is there any examination of the effects of the war on American labour. However Professor Leuditenberg does toudi on one supremely important point when he refers to the extent to which the administration of America's famous New Deal in the 1930s drew upon the experience of the previous war: »When in 1933 a new government came to power in the midst of a major crisis, it would know no way to mobilize the country save by invoking the experience of World War I, the only occasion when modern America had acted as a nation. As a result, the early New Deal would draw less on populism or progressivism than on the war mobilization, and the NRA would be drafted and administered by men -Baruch, Hugh Johnson, Swope, Leo Wolman, and many others -who had gained their experience in wartime Washington and cherished their memory of it through the 1920's 22 .« In an important recent article Professor Leuchtenberg has further developed these points. But he has also pointed out that in some respects »the war analogue proved either treacherous or inadequate«. »The very need to employ imagery whidi was so often inappropriate revealed both an impoverished tradition of reform and the reluctance of the nation to come to terms with the leviathan state 23 .« Indeed the moral which arises from any serious study of the relation between war and social diange is not the comforting one that at least the brutalities of war are accompanied by desirable reforms and readjustments, but the uncomfortable one that so far human societies in the twentieth century seem to have found it very difficult to initiate diange without being impelled to it by the stark necessities of War.
